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INTRODUCTION
In the first half of 2009 the Solomon Islands 
Government froze portions of its budget in 
the face of severe financial pressures. This 
followed several years of very strong revenue 
and expenditure growth during which the 
Solomon Islands Government appropriated 
increasingly large proportions of revenue to 
the consolidated development budget. This 
paper examines this budget from 2004-2008. 
It argues that for a variety of reasons much of 
Solomon Islands Government development 
spending over this period was poor, and that 
to improve budgetary outcomes in the face 
of weak future revenue, the consolidated 
development budget needs strengthening. 
In doing so, this paper suggests practical 
steps that Solomon Islands Government and 
donors could support to improve budgetary 
outcomes.
Why lOOk AT ThE 
CONSOlIDATED DEvElOPMENT 
BUDGET?
This paper examines the development 
funds managed by Solomon Islands 
Government (SIG) from 2004 to 2008 (called 
the consolidated development budget1). This 
may appear dry, but correctly interpreted, 
provides a wealth of information about how 
the SIG operates. First, because budgets 
aim to efficiently allocate resources to meet 
objectives, an analysis can present a better 
indication of the SIG’s priorities than formal 
pronouncements, policies, or plans. Second, 
because the budget is the culmination of a 
process, examining the process illustrates 
how SIG operates. For example, whether the 
budget delivers high quality social services 
or benefits certain individuals, examining 
how this occurs offers important insights 
for reformers hoping to improve budgetary 
outcomes. 
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Examining this budget also comes at an 
important time for SIG financial management 
– in April 2009 SIG reserved portions of 
its budget appropriation, effectively freezing 
unessential spending (Solomon Star 2009). 
SIG now has to manage its funds more 
effectively than ever, particularly because 
future revenue prospects are weak (IMF 2008). 
Indeed, the IMF recently recommended that 
SIG restructure the budget to “enhance the 
transparency and accountability of spending 
by both the central government and line 
ministries to ensure that monies are not 
misspent” (IMF 2008). The analysis in this 
paper will hopefully be useful in this regard.
BACkGROUND TO SOlOMON 
ISlANDS
The Solomon Islands has a population 
of approximately 500,000 and is located in 
the South-West Pacific. From 1998-2003 
ethnic tensions engulfed parts of the country 
and government largely ceased to operate. 
A multilateral intervention led by Australia 
(the Regional Assistance Mission to the 
Solomon Islands (RAMSI)) arrived in 2003 
and restored law and order. It also directed 
significant resources to help SIG rebuild the 
country, including the strengthening of its 
financial management. In 2008 the World 
Bank continued to classify the Solomon 
Islands as a fragile state2.
SIG BUDGET STRUCTURE
Like many countries, SIG has a recurrent 
and development budget. The recurrent 
budget is prepared by Ministry of Finance 
and Treasury (Finance) and meets ongoing 
expenses such as salaries, utilities, 
consumables, and debt repayments. The 
majority of financial management is performed 
by Finance, and for this reason the majority of 
donor support and engagement on financial 
management is with this ministry. However, 
the development budget is prepared by the 
Ministry of Development Planning and Aid 
Coordination (Planning), which receives 
very little donor support. SIG development 
spending, which one could consider revenue 
that exceeds recurrent requirements, is used 
for one-off expenditures such as capital 
works or development projects. It is, hence, 
often used for complex undertakings with 
implications for future recurrent costs.
The development budget process is also 
the principal SIG process for coordinating 
donor assistance. Whilst this paper does 
not examine this aspect of the development 
budget, the traits it exhibits have implications 
for aid coordination. Given the scale of 
development assistance, which from 2004-
2008 was far larger than SIG revenue, 
donors and SIG need to both consider how 
they can support this part of the SIG budget 
process. 
SIG DEvElOPMENT SPENDING
Between 2004 and 2008 SIG revenue is 
estimated to have increased at a remarkable 
27% per annum (SIG 2008a), driven by 
unsustainable logging and large donor 
aid inflows (IMF 2008). This prompted a 
surge in SIG spending, so that by 2007 it 
had overtaken revenue and depleted cash 
reserves (IMF 2008). This unsustainable 
spending growth led the SIG’s Medium Term 
Fiscal Strategy to urge spending cuts. 
The spending surge was particularly 
noticeable in the development budget; from 
2004 to 2008 consolidated development 
budget appropriations3 more than doubled 
each year. As can be seen in figure 1, by 
2008 they were five times greater than 
their 10-year inflation adjusted average. 
This growth, from just 9% of SIG’s entire 
(recurrent and development) appropriation 
in 2004 to 23% by 2008, strongly suggests 
that over this period the SIG made funding its 
development budget a priority. It also suggests 
that the majority of donor support for financial 
management, which was concentrated in 
Finance, will have found it harder to support 
SIG’s overall budget processes.
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figure 1. Change in SIG expenditure in the 
Development Estimates. (Source 2008 Develop-
ment Estimates).
The composition of the development 
budget tells us about specific SIG priorities. Of 
particular note was the rapid growth in grant 
funds4 managed by Members of Parliament 
(MPs). In 2007, 31% of consolidated 
development spending went on these grants, 
which after adjusting for inflation, is far 
above their historical average (figure 2). It 
is noteworthy that over this period the rapid 
increase in MP managed funding was also 
seen in the neighbouring countries of Papua 
New Guinea and Vanuatu.
Unfortunately the quality of this spending 
is questionable, being fraught with allegations 
of misappropriation, unfair distributions, and 
outright conversion (SIG 2003). Yet it is 
precisely these allegations that make such 
grants appealing. First, it enables MPs to 
meet the demands of their constituents, 
whether they be a passage home, school 
fees, or otherwise; 69% of Solomon Islanders 
consider the job of an MP is to help the 
individuals in his or her electorate (ANU 
2007). Second, it presents an opportunity 
for personal gain, either though graft or by 
bestowing patronage - running an election 
campaign is expensive, and an MP’s 
meagre salary necessitates some form of 
reimbursement. Indeed, it is noteworthy that 
Members of Parliament felt their delivery 
of goods and services to constituents was 
perceived by state institutions to be acts 
of corruption, whereas they were acting in 
repsonse to long-held cultural expectations of 
them as community leaders (Hayward-Jones 
2008). Third, SIG has struggled to deliver 
services, and MPs impatience with the ability 
of the public service to quickly implement 
development projects has led some to believe 
that they can better meet the needs of their 
people directly. Taken together, this makes 
the impact of MP administered grant funds 
highly questionable, and dependent largely 
upon the individual MP.  It may also be why 
only one MP reported on the use of their 
grants in 20075.
Reducing the demand from MPs for these 
grants will be difficult; an analysis of past 
budgets show that during the 1998-2003 
tensions, despite a collapse in revenue that 
prevented SIG delivering most essential 
services, MP administered grant spending 
actually grew slightly, so that in 2001 it 
consumed 18% of all SIG revenue. 
In addition to the growth in MP 
administered funds, the development budget 
shows a strong growth in grants managed 
by ‘productive sector’6 ministries. In 2007, 
nearly half of all consolidated development 
spending was on these grants. This spending 
is slightly more transparent that that of 
MP administered grants, for expenditure is 
processed through Finance. However, when 
these ministerial grants have been examined 
by the Office of the Auditor General, the 
findings were alarming. For example, the 
Tertiary Scholarships Program suffered a 
gross failure of budgetary procedures, with 
decisions made by government officials 
outside the normal …approach and with 
Ministerial favouritism applied (SIG 2007a). 
The remaining fifth of the 2007 consolidated 
development budget was spent principally on 
constructing or refurbishing buildings. 
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figure 2. Change in Consolidated (SIG and 
ROC) Development Expenditure funding for Rural 
Communtiy Development grants. (Source SIG 
Development Estimates 1980 - 2008).
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PREPARATION Of ThE 
DEvElOPMENT BUDGET – 
A GlIMPSE Of INfORMAl 
PROCESSES 
In preparing the development budget, 
all ministries are meant to submit spending 
proposals to Planning for appraisal. These 
proposals often take lots of time and effort 
to prepare, and require a suite of skills that 
are in great demand across SIG. Once 
received, Planning appraises the spending 
proposals, consults with relevant ministries, 
and discusses funding options with donors. 
Ultimately Planning recommends specific 
proposals to Cabinet for domestic funding as 
part of the budget process.  
Unfortunately, adherence to this process 
is poor. Figure 3 was prepared by Planning 
(SIG 2007b), and illustrates the submission 
of 2007 development budget proposals. Time 
is across the horizontal axis, and the value of 
development budget submissions in million 
of Solomon Islands Dollars (SBD) is on 
the vertical axis. As can be seen, spending 
proposals arrive throughout the year. 95% of 
all spending proposals by value arrived after 
the initial deadline (first arrow).
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When the deadline was extended by 
six weeks (second arrow), many more 
spending proposals arrived. This followed 
a concerted effort by Planning officers to 
engage with officials in line ministries – 
figure 3. Value of new proposals each fortnight 
during 2006. (Source: Presentation by SIG 
Ministry of Development Planning and Aid 
Coordination).
numerous individuals responded positively, 
and genuinely strove to meet deadlines. 
Often these individuals simply were unaware 
of due process, or lacked specialist skills that 
Planning were able to augment - a capacity 
constraint in line ministries, if you will.
However, it also became clear that 
capacity was not the only issue - budget 
deadlines slipped despite the availability of 
support from Planning. The resulting delays 
had critical impacts on the quality of the 
budget. First, Planning officials had less time 
to appraise spending proposals, and less 
time for consultations with line ministries. This 
removed any real opportunities for Planning 
to constructively engage with line ministries 
on the budget process and their spending 
proposals. Second, it was more difficult for 
officials in Planning and Finance to ensure 
the development and recurrent budgets were 
coherent. This makes it far more difficult 
to ensure domestic and donor spending is 
relevant, appropriate and sustainable. Third, 
real opportunities for SIG to engage with 
donors on projects that could have received 
external financing were missed. Given the 
constant demands from SIG that donors 
should better reflect domestic development 
priorities, this is surprising. 
As the 2007 development budget process 
continued, it became apparent where the 
real deadline was. The third arrow in figure 
3 represents the date that Cabinet were to 
consider the draft budget. Many bids arrived 
in anticipation of this meeting. Cabinet was 
delayed, finally considering the draft budget 
at the fourth arrow. As can be seen, 41% 
of spending proposals by value arrived in 
the four weeks preceding this meeting. This 
made it impossible for Planning to adequately 
consider spending proposals. It also 
suggested that many SIG officials saw the 
Cabinet meetings as the key decision making 
step in the budget process. And rightly so - in 
2006, 2007 and 2008, approximately 50%, 
17% and 50% respectively of development 
funding was decided during Cabinet budget 
meetings without reference to any spending 
proposals (RAMSI 2008). To some degree 
this phenomenon can be seen in all countries, 
including developed, and represents political 
imperatives. However, the proportion of 
development spending decided by cabinet is 
remarkably high.
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The likelihood that Cabinet will make a 
poorly informed decision removes many of 
the incentives for SIG officials to adhere to 
due process. Preparing good development 
budget submissions takes lots of preparatory 
work. Even if staff with the requisite skills 
are available to do this work, at appraisal 
Planning may not support the proposal. 
Moreover, even if Planning does support 
the proposal, Cabinet may not. Thus, by 
working hard and following due process, 
obtaining funding is difficult and rejection at 
Cabinet would be disheartening. A far easier 
means of obtaining funding would be to lobby 
Cabinet members to support your spending 
proposal, particularly if you believe Planning 
will argue against you.
Planning also observed two other 
characteristics during the 2007 development 
budget process (SIG 2007b). First, funding 
proposals were often of poor quality, 
conveniently rounded to the nearest million 
dollars. Second, the total funding requested 
was about ten times greater than available 
funding. Taken together it was clear that 
many spending proposals were speculative, 
undermining the attempts of those SIG officers 
preparing genuine spending proposals.
Given the dynamic experienced in the 
2007 development budget process, a two 
stage process was envisaged for the 2008 
development budget. The first step would be 
very simple; ministries submitted proposals 
of just one sentence to Finance who, in 
consultation with Planning, prepared a 
Cabinet Submission. The intention was to 
engage Cabinet at an early stage in the 
budget process and seek their direction on 
what spending proposals were interesting. 
Theoretically, with direction from Cabinet, 
ministries could concentrate on preparing a 
smaller number of better quality proposals. 
Unfortunately, as illustrated in figure 4, almost 
all single sentence bids were submitted 
late (SIG 2007c). Deadlines slipped and 
the problems identified in 2007 reoccurred. 
However, unlike in previous years, the 
simplicity of this step led many to conclude 
that a lack of ‘will’ rather than a lack of 
‘capacity’7 was culpable – for a variety of 
reasons, SIG officials were reluctant to follow 
the new process.
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SPENDING fUNDS – MORE 
INfORMAl PROCESSES
The poor process compliance during 
budget preparations had severe implications 
for the quality of SIG expenditure. 
In an effort to quantify how well non-MP 
administered funds8 were used in the 2007 
development budget, Planning used two 
very simple measures; total expenditure as 
an indicator of quantity, and expenditure 
compliance9 as an indicator of quality (SIG 
2007b).  
The first measure used monthly 
expenditure reports prepared by Finance. It 
revealed significant under-spending against 
some budget items, and worrying over-
spending against other budget items. The 
scale of the problem suggests that in 2007 
the consolidated development budget did 
not deliver: under-spending totalled 40% of 
SIG’s development appropriation and over-
spending was 32% of SIG’s development 
expenditure. 
Under-spending means that projects are 
not implemented on time, and in some 
instances, are never implemented. For 
example, funds appropriated for improving 
Gizo town’s water supply were only partially 
spent, and following the April 2007 tsunami, 
were redirected towards other activities. 
figure 4. 2008 Development Budget - delays in 
process compliance. (Source: Presentation by the 
SIG Ministry of Development Planning and Aid 
Coordination).
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The causes for this under-spending 
were identified by Planning as basically 
threefold. First, what is termed by many, 
capacity constraints - many SIG officials 
lack the specialist skills needed to plan, 
tender and implement complex development 
projects, or are simply unaware of procedural 
requirements. 
This lack of capacity in SIG middle 
management has been compounded by the 
very ambitious growth in the consolidated 
development budget from 2004-2008. For 
example, during the preparation of the 
2008 development budget the Ministry of 
Infrastructure Development had just one 
engineer and one architect to support the 
implementation of nearly fifty projects. 
Moreover, in 2008 implementation was 
particularly difficult because delays in the 
budget process meant that the Appropriation 
Bill was not enacted until after the first 
financial quarter had already passed (SIG 
2008b), so SIG officials had just 9 months to 
implement the budget.
Second, poor process compliance during 
the preparation of the development budget 
often means that preparatory work only starts 
after funding has been secured. This can 
delay implementation significantly, particularly 
if it involves the resolution of legal issues or 
extensive consultation, as is in the case in 
land acquisition. And as noted above, it also 
requires specialist skills that are scarce in 
Solomon Islands. 
Third, on occasion, the original vision for 
a project changes following appropriation. 
Officials then have to redesign projects to 
reflect this new thinking, which takes time.
Examining the nature of over expenditure 
revealed alarmingly poor process compliance. 
As stated, in 2007, 32% of all SIG development 
spending was over-expenditure. The majority 
of this was contrary to financial instructions 
or on occasion illegal, as it was greater 
than what was budgeted or greater than the 
parliamentary appropriation. In reading local 
newspapers and examining the budget for 
which projects over-spent, it is clear that in 
2007 most of the over-spending occurred 
in select productive sector ministries shortly 
before a change in Government10. It is arguable 
that this spending was in fact an attempt to 
maintain the cohesion of the ruling coalition. 
Indeed, it is widely thought that Members of 
Parliament were sometimes motivated by 
a need to obtain funds quickly to threaten 
a vote of no confidence (Hayward-Jones 
2008). This partly explains the popularity of 
grant funding in general, and the broader 
unwillingness to follow due process - the ad 
hoc disbursement of development funds is 
ideally suited to the fluid relationships and 
politics which characterise life in Solomon 
Islands. 
The development funds provided by the 
Republic of China (Taiwan) (ROC) were also 
poorly managed by SIG, and raise process 
compliance issues. Examination of the 2008 
Development Estimates show that in 2007 the 
SIG spent SBD 20.2 million of its own funds 
on projects that were to be funded by ROC11. 
Moreover, in the 2008 Development Budget 
Estimates it is clear that some ROC funding 
was spent without any appropriation.
Attempts to adhere to due process 
can cause serious implementation delays. 
For example, figure 5 illustrates monthly 
spending in the 2006 development budget 
(SIG 2007b), excluding grants managed by 
MPs. Spending that followed due process 
is represented as red, and that which did 
not follow due process is blue. As can be 
seen, it took several months for ministries 
to spend funds in line with due process, yet 
unapproved spending remained reasonably 
consistent throughout the year. These delays 
contributed to levels of spending that were 
far below the appropriation – if all funds were 
to be used, average spending would have 
been closer to December’s levels.
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figure 5. 2006 expenditure as a proxy for 
implementation. (Source: Presentation by the 
SIG Ministry of Development Planning and Aid 
Coordination).
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These implementation delays have 
potentially serious consequences for those 
project managers trying to follow correct 
procedures, as Cabinet becomes frustrated 
with that individual. Moreover, delayed 
spending may result in Cabinet using funds for 
alternative purposes. For example, as widely 
reported in Solomon Islands media in 2007, 
after spending four months preparing detailed 
implementation plans for a SBD 4 million 
reforestation project, appropriated funds 
were then spent on sawmilling equipment. 
This damaged the morale of those officials 
who prepared the original project, and 
weakened the incentives for future process 
compliance. Furthermore, because the 
SIG development budget has no forward 
estimates, and funds are only available for 
one year, delayed projects risk curtailed 
future funding, particularly if the government 
or ministers change. Together this may be a 
contributing factor for the popularity of grant 
funding from MPs and ministries – it can be 
spent quickly and in the eyes of constituents, 
yields immediate results. 
SUMMARy Of ISSUES SO fAR
This paper has identified three issues. 
First, that from 2004-2008, the development 
funds managed by SIG increased to historic 
highs. Most of these funds were either 
transferred directly to MPs or poorly managed 
SIG grants. However, very little donor support 
is provided to the operation of this budget. 
Second, it is clear that SIG processes are 
not followed during the preparation of the 
development budget, due to a combination 
of inadequate will and capacity constraints. 
Third, that again due to capacity and will 
shortfalls, spending does not follow correct 
procedures. 
GENERATING IMPROvEMENTS
The SIG development budget is part of 
the wider budget process. It is designed 
to ensure that aid is well managed, and 
that some domestic funds are used for 
development priorities that donors won’t 
support. However, as documented in this 
paper, the preparation and expenditure 
processes around SIG managed development 
funds are poorly followed, and consequently 
spending outcomes are weak.
In this context, the growth in SIG 
appropriations to the development budget 
has made its sound management important. 
Moreover, if SIG’s expenditure growth is 
to be restrained, as urged by the SIG’s 
Medium Term Fiscal Strategy and IMF, the 
development budget needs attention. 
Improving the development budget is 
the responsibility of SIG. Donors can only 
support their efforts. This may explain why, 
even with significant levels of donor support 
to Finance since 2003, past attempts to 
improve national budgeting have only had 
modest successes – most recommendations 
of the SIG Office of the Auditor General and 
SIG Public Accounts Committee have not 
been followed up, and of late there has been 
no improvements in financial management 
across SIG (RAMSI 2008). 
The improvements to the budget that 
donors successfully facilitated were generally 
piecemeal and taken opportunistically. Broader 
reforms, such as those promulgated during 
the preparation of the 2008 budget process, 
were unsuccessful (RAMSI 2008). Thus, 
whilst modest incremental improvements to 
the budget will be possible, extensive reforms 
will be difficult given existing incentives within 
SIG - the late Solomon Island Auditor General 
noted that: weak processes and systems 
provide opportunities for inappropriate 
behaviour; there are few consequences for 
inappropriate behaviour or rewards for good 
behaviour, and; there is a lack of demand 
for good governance which ensures [the] 
ongoing transparency, accountability and 
integrity of government (SIG 2007a). 
Changing attitudes to financial 
management will be a slow process, for the 
Solomon Islands has no bureaucratic tradition. 
The position of the ruling elite will thus have 
a huge impact on the ultimate success of 
any reforms (Fukuyama 2004). Interestingly, 
Solomon Island media has commentated that 
the adoption of a preferential voting system 
akin to the one introduced in Papua New 
Guinea in 2007 may remove some incentives 
for MP grants being used as patronage.
In this context, donors should consider 
maintaining flexible program designs to 
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enable advisors to operate in an iterative 
manner, supporting reformers when they 
emerge, across the whole of SIG. This 
is a departure from the normal ‘planned’ 
approach so often use by donors.
IMPROvING BUDGET 
PREPARATION
Weaknesses in the preparation of the 
development budget translate into poor 
development outcomes. Improving this 
situation requires capacity development, 
generating ‘will’, and supporting reform 
‘champions’. Donors have opportunities to 
enhance their existing models of assistance 
to support such an approach.
First, as increasingly recognised by 
donors, support for financial management 
needs to include Planning, for it manages the 
development budget. Second, support needs 
to strengthen the ability of line agencies to 
plan, budget, tender and manage projects. 
In particular, to support the preparation of 
spending proposals. This has been recognised 
for some time, but was not pursued owing to 
a failure of coordination amongst donors 
(RAMSI 2007). 
To promote greater change, individual 
advisors in central agencies of Finance 
and Planning should focus on building 
closer relationships with key figures in line 
ministries and adopt a supportive role to 
complement their current policing and policy 
roles. This was considered by Planning 
officers a key element of improved process 
compliance during the preparation of the 
2007 development budget (SIG 2007b). 
Third, support in line ministries that is 
provided under various donor programs 
could better support SIG officials in the 
budget process. This has yielded good 
results in the past. For example, TA to 
the National Parliament actively supported 
participation in the development budget 
process with great success. In addition to 
solid project outcomes, this flexible approach 
won the support of SIG colleagues, built their 
awareness of due process, and helped forge 
stronger relationships between SIG officials 
in Planning and National Parliament.
IMPROvING ExPENDITURE 
COMPlIANCE
It has long been recognised that robust 
systems can be used to obligate process 
compliance, and conversely, that weak 
systems provide opportunities to bypass due 
process. Moreover, good systems can yield 
efficiency dividends, simplify processes and 
facilitate analytical work.
Most SIG financial management systems 
are located in Finance and numerous 
weaknesses have been identified by the 
Office of the Auditor General. To their credit, 
the SIG has recently started to upgrade 
these systems, but with mixed results. SIG 
attempted to upgrade the general ledger 
when it appropriated funds in the 2008 
development budget. However, the upgrade 
did not progress as planned, and contrasts 
with the successful implementation of a 
new payroll system through a co-funding 
arrangement between SIG and RAMSI 
(RAMSI 2007).
The success of this joint initiative provides 
two important lessons: donor co-funding 
of genuine SIG priorities can be highly 
successful because it compliments ‘will’, and; 
donor co-funding can be used to improve 
how well SIG funds are used.
With this in mind, in addition to improving 
systems and co-funding SIG projects, donors 
have significant opportunities to strengthen 
SIG process compliance by using the 
processes themselves, as per the Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (OECD 
2005) and the Accra Agenda for Action (OECD 
2008).  In adopting such an approach, donors 
need to more explicitly consider the potential 
development returns against likely fiduciary 
risks, for accepting some fiduciary risk may 
yield significant development returns. To 
minimise donors’ fiduciary risks, processes 
can be adopted by donors as and when 
they are sufficiently robust, with low risk 
project design, monitoring, evaluation, and 
reporting being adopted well before financial 
and procurement processes. A corollary of 
these shared management arrangements 
should be reduced management costs, 
closer working relationships and reduced 
administrative burdens on SIG.
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ThE ROlE Of TEChNICAl 
ASSISTANCE
Much has been written on capacity 
development and technical assistance in 
Solomon Islands, and this paper only makes 
reference to it in a few regards.
Firstly, the fragility of the SIG administration 
requires donors to adopt a ‘do-no-harm’ 
approach (OECD 2007). This is because, 
as Fukuyama suggests in Africa, despite 
the best intentions of donors, over the long-
term their actions may have destroyed 
capacity (Fukuyama 2004). In this regard, 
it is fundamental that the supplementation 
of capacity over the short-term (to meet 
immediate needs) is carefully balanced with 
genuine capacity development over the long-
term. 
Secondly, given the political and cultural 
complexity of the Solomon Islands, as stated 
earlier, for genuine success a ‘piecemeal 
reform’ approach that operates iteratively 
and opportunistically is more likely to deliver 
sustainable results than the planned design 
traditional employed by donors. This requires 
TA with sufficient delegated authority to enable 
them to operate flexibly and make decisions 
independently. In this regard, the growing 
pressure on donors to deliver demonstrable 
results presents a particular risk, as advisors 
may concentrate on delivering outputs rather 
than developing capacity. For example, 
a large amount of effort …has gone into 
creating new systems …so that the advisor 
can meet the outputs and deadlines specified 
in their terms of reference (RAMSI 2007). 
Third, an iterative approach requires certain 
types of advisors. All need a suite of strong 
interpersonal and relationship management 
skills that enable them to operate across 
SIG. Such skills are recognised by Solomon 
Islanders as far more important than technical 
prowess. Indeed, the engagement of SIG 
staff with RAMSI counterparts seems largely 
dependent on the quality and nature of 
their personal relationships which play the 
determinant role in shaping their professional 
lives (Morgan 2007). 
In an iterative reform scenario, seasoned 
development practitioners with many years 
of field-experience can provide strategic 
direction and consider the polity of reforms 
for individuals at the different management 
levels of SIG. Moreover, because change 
takes time, continuity in the provision of 
advisors will better retain and augment 
knowledge, and provide sufficient time for 
relationships and trust to blossom.  
Lastly, because doing no harm is 
paramount, advisors should concentrate 
principally on strengthening existing SIG 
processes and systems before promoting 
large procedural reforms.  
IMPROvED TRANSPARENCy
Improved transparency can encourage 
better process compliance because people 
are more aware of who is doing what. 
It can also stimulate demand for further 
improvements. For example, the sterling work 
of the SIG Office of the Auditor General from 
2004-2008 has enlivened national debate 
and stimulated widespread interest in SIG 
financial affairs. 
In the development budget, two immediate 
improvements are apparent. First, there can 
to be better and more regular reporting, 
particularly to key decision makers. For 
example, Finance does not even collect data 
on the level of compliance with Financial 
Instructions across the public service (RAMSI 
2008), and whilst Planning compiles useful 
information on basic process compliance (see 
figure 5), it is not part of a reporting process. 
Moreover, Planning currently does not monitor 
or report on project implementation in situ, 
making it impossible to verify the delivery 
of projects. This paper does not advocate 
complex monitoring or reporting, merely 
the improvement of reporting to promote 
transparency. 
Such reporting can be encouraged in 
several ways: the automation of reports 
through system upgrades; the need for 
mutual accountability espoused in the Paris 
Declaration (OECD 2005), and; joint reporting 
as donors integrate their processes into those 
of SIG. There are significant opportunities 
under the latter option, a corollary being 
capacity development of SIG officers.
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Second, the format of the budget could be 
improved to promote transparency. A single 
budget document that includes the recurrent 
and development estimates would make it 
easier for decision makers to see the big 
picture. This need not alter budget processes 
nor the roles of SIG Ministries. In doing 
so, the inadequately detailed development 
budget can improve specificity. Conversely, 
the recurrent budget could be simplified, for 
its excessive detail does obscure the big 
picture. Three-year forward estimates in the 
recurrent budget would make the true cost 
of development projects more transparent 
by presenting and making provision for 
the ongoing costs of development funding 
decisions. Moreover, both budgets need to 
link their inputs more to their stated outputs. 
Ideally, at some stage in the future, the 
recurrent budget could move from an input 
budget, which specifies what funds will be 
provided each year, to an activity budget, that 
specifies what will be done with the funds, 
as per the current format of the development 
budget. 
SUMMARy
The increasingly large amounts of 
development spending by Solomon Islands 
Government from 2004-2008 were generally 
of poor quality. In many respects, the 
appropriations grew faster than SIG’s ability 
of the effectively administer them. Given 
the Solomon Islands Government is now 
facing serious financial pressures, it is more 
important than ever that the preparation 
and management of the national budget is 
considered in its entirety, and this requires 
strengthening the development budget 
process in addition to the recurrent budget. 
The ‘will’ to improve budget management 
will ultimately come from SIG, but donors 
have a number of opportunities to accelerate 
prospective reforms to the development 
budget. Importantly, recognising where this 
will lies in the complex politics of the Solomon 
Islands requires an iterative approach to 
piecemeal reforms, with donors supporting 
Solomon Islanders via the deployment of TA 
with strong interpersonal skills. Real gains 
will probably come by widening the traditional 
focus on Finance to include Planning and 
line ministries.  Donor use of low fiduciary 
risk SIG systems and processes such as 
planning, monitoring and reporting would 
also strengthen capacity and improve SIG 
development expenditure.
AUThOR NOTES
Peter Coventry worked for nearly three 
years with the Regional Assistance Mission 
to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI) as advisor to 
the Solomon Islands Ministry of Development 
Planning and Aid Coordination. He now works 
in Papua New Guinea for the Australian 
Agency for International Development 
(AusAID). The views expressed in this paper 
are those of the author and based on an 
analysis of publically available documents. 
They do not represent the position of AusAID 
or RAMSI. 
ENDNOTES
Consolidated development funds include 1. 
SIG revenue and development assistance 
from the Republic of China (Taiwan).
The World Bank definition of a fragile 2. 
state covers low-income countries scoring 
3.2 and below on the Country Policy and 
Institutional Assessment (CPIA), which 
is the primary tool they use to assess 
the quality of governance. The Solomon 
Islands’ 3-year average CPIA from 2005 
to 2007 was 2.8 (Joint IMF/World Bank 
Debt Sustainability Analysis of Solomon 
Islands, September 10, 2008). 
To spend budgeted funds, SIG needs 3. 
approval from Parliament, which is known 
as an Appropriation.
MP administered funds have had a variety 4. 
of names since 1980. Of late the most well 
known has been the Rural Constituency 
Development Fund (RCDF), which has no 
reporting requirements and is transferred 
in tranches directly into bank accounts 
nominated by MPs.
The Honourable Fred Fono, Member for 5. 
Central Kwara’ae.
The ‘productive sector’ is represented by 6. 
the ministries of Agriculture, Commerce, 
Fisheries, Forestry, and Tourism.
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Capacity is often cited as an impediment 7. 
to complying with process. However, 
the simplicity of complying with this step 
suggested compliance incentives or ‘will’ 
was the determining factor.
MP administered grant funds were 8. 
excluded from this analysis because 
process compliance could not be 
measured as it could for SIG administered 
funds.
Expenditure process compliance is 9. 
relatively simple – ministries must prepare 
a project work-plan and have it approved 
by Planning. Spending and achievements 
against this work-plan are then monitored 
by Planning.
This was deduced using media reports in 10. 
conjunction with an analysis of the 2008 
Development Budget Estimates.
This was calculated by examining the 11. 
2007 and 2008 Development Budget 
Estimates.
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